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Abstract

ev

Zéphirin Nganmeni Roland Pongou Bertrand Tchantcho Jean-Baptiste Tondji∗

We develop a theory that addresses the problem of the existence of stable vaccine allocations in a political economy. These are allocation policies that a political
leader can enforce without losing their popularity. Our analysis distinguishes between contexts where vaccination has positive externalities and contexts where it

pe

does not. We show that a stable allocation may not exist if vaccine supply is sufficiently low relative to the number of individuals eligible to receive a dose. We then
fully characterize the minimum number of vaccine doses that guarantees the existence of a stable vaccine allocation, regardless of society’s preference heterogeneity

ot

level. Minimum dose number depends only on a society’s influence structure or
voting rule. When individuals have unequal voting rights, stable allocations favor
those with greater voting power. We generalize our main characterization result to

tn

economies where spatial proximity between individuals varies and preferences are
unselfish due to positive vaccine externalities. Applying the theory, we find that
a political leader can enforce stable vaccine allocation policies that are minority-

rin

inclusive only when the supply of vaccines is sufficiently high.
Keywords: Vaccine allocation game, influence structure, leader popularity, (un)selfish
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preferences, spatial proximity, externalities, minority and inclusion.
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Introduction

We develop a theory that addresses the problem of the existence of stable vaccine
allocations in a political economy. These are allocation policies that a political leader can

enforce without losing their popularity. In our analysis, we distinguish between contexts

where vaccination has positive externalities on the unvaccinated and contexts where it
does not. When vaccination only benefits the vaccinated individual, agents have selfish

ev

preferences; and when it has positive externalities, agents have unselfish preferences.

Our analysis is timely and fitting, given the current COVID-19 crisis. Indeed, recent
political events have demonstrated how the popularity of political leaders can depend on

er
r

how well they manage major global crises such as pandemics. These crises can both reinforce and undermine the popularity of the status quo (or incumbent policy) depending
on how a leader performs and how the electorate perceives this performance. Decisions
made by political leaders or institutions in response to a major crisis can affect political

pe

support in two ways. First, major crises can rally the electorate around the status quo
when they perceive that the decisions made in the crisis by incumbent governments bring
some relief (Healy & Malhotra, 2009; Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011; Bol et al., 2021). Second, when handled poorly, major crises can reduce support for incumbent leaders, shifting

ot

the electorate’s preferences towards political rivals in democratic societies and fostering
regime change in authoritarian ones (Aidt & Leon, 2016; Ruiz-Rufino & Alonso, 2017;
Baccini et al., 2021). These mechanisms of retrospective performance evaluation induce

tn

accountability among leaders, as the electorate tends to reward leaders for making good
leadership decisions and punishes them for making bad ones. The study by Herrera et al.
(2020) which analyses government responses to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-

rin

19) pandemic, is consistent with this view. It shows that, when experiencing increasing
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)1 infections and deaths,
governments that prioritized health over short-term economic gains obtained higher ap-

ep

proval rates than those that failed to do so. Along these lines, Baccini et al. (2021) and
several viewpoints from news outlets, including, Acosta & Stracqualursi (2021), Oliphant
(2021), and McEvoy (2021), have partly attributed Donald Trump’s reelection loss to his

Pr

administration’s mismanagement of COVID-19 pandemic. On the same line, according to
1

SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that causes COVID-19.

1
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BALLOTPEDIA (2021), the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the recall election

seeking to remove California Governor Gavin Newsom on September 14, 2021.2 Similarly,
faced with plunging approval ratings over the summer amid public dissatisfaction with
how his administration handled the pandemic (especially the vaccination program) and

the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, Yoshihide Suga, Japan’s Prime Minister, said he would not
seek re-election after just a year in office (Rich, 2021).

ev

Given these realities, it is essential to investigate the conditions under which political

leaders and governments have the ability to implement pandemic-containing policies that
mitigate adverse short-term effects. We address this broad question in the specific context
of the allocation of vaccines, which can help reverse the spread of a pandemic. How can a

er
r

leader allocate a limited supply of vaccine doses in a heterogeneous society without risking
their popularity or their chances of re-election? We address this question through the lens
of an allocation model that we describe as follows.

A pandemic disease caused by a virus is affecting the livelihood of residents in a

pe

society which consists of a finite set of individuals or agents, N = {1, 2, ..., n}, with
n ≥ 3. Thanks to advanced technology in medical science and financial government
investments, a safe and effective vaccine against the virus has been developed and is
approved for emergency use. However, the number of available doses, µ, is limited:

ot

µ < n, where µ is a non-zero integer. Given N and µ, an allocation of the µ vaccine
doses to individuals is any S ⊆ N such |S| ≤ µ, where |S| denotes the cardinality of S.

tn

We denote by N (µ) the set of allocations of µ vaccine doses. Each individual i ∈ N has
a preference relation, which we denote by -i , over the set N (µ) which is a weak ordering
(i.e., complete and transitive). In the society, an influence structure (or voting rule) I
collects influential coalitions—groups of individuals that have the power or ability to rule

rin

out any proposed allocation in N (µ) regardless of the preferences of agents outside of
these coalitions—. We refer to the pair E = (N, I) as a political economy, and the couple
(E, µ) as a vaccine allocation problem. For any preference profile (-i ), we consider the

ep

tuple G = h(E, µ), (-i )i as a vaccine allocation game. Given these concepts, the goal
of a social planner or political leader is to design a vaccine allocation solution that only
proposes stable outcomes, i.e., allocations that would not be successfully challenged by
The Governor Gavin Newsom survived the recall petition as a majority of California voters say “No”

Pr

2

by allowing him to stay in office until at least 2023.

2
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With this model, we examine the following questions:
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influential coalitions in the society.

1. Under which conditions on I and µ does a stable vaccine allocation exist?

2. What is the minimal number of vaccine doses that guarantees the existence of a
stable allocation?

3. How does voting power affect priority in access to a vaccine?

ev

We exploit a classical equilibrium solution (Black, 1948; Gillies, 1959; Serrano, 1995)
in the blocking approach (Dutta & Vohra, 2017) to investigate these questions in two
different environments.3 In the first environment, agents are selfish, and care only about

er
r

maximizing their own utility. In the second environment, agents can be described as
having“other regarding preferences”, meaning that agents have preferences regarding other
agents’ material payoffs and may or may not have preferences regarding their own material
payoffs. In this case we will assume that an agent prefers an allocation where their closest
neighbor receives a vaccine dose (at the expense of a more distant neighbor) to one

pe

in which the converse happens. We will also assume that agents have no preferences
regarding their material payoffs, meaning that agents will prefer allocations where close
neighbors are prioritized over distant neighbors even if such allocations result in the agents
themselves receiving no doses. While the assumptions in this second environment may

ot

be unrealistic, a less absolute form of this environment is highly prevalent in real life,
as individuals have preferences that are determined by their ethnic, gender, and cultural

tn

proximity to others; see, for example, Rabin (1993), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Dufwenberg
et al. (2011), Dimick et al. (2018), Bosi et al. (2021), and an excellent survey by Kagel &
Roth (2020). We exploit insights from this environment to derive implications for inclusive
allocation policies in a society that features minority groups.

rin

Under the assumption that each agent behaves selfishly in their attempt to obtain a
vaccine dose4 , Theorem 1 shows that the number of vaccine doses and the society’s influ3

According to this equilibrium concept, a policy X is an equilibrium (or is stable) if there does not

ep

exist another policy Y that is preferred to X by an influential coalition under the prevailing influence

structure (or voting rule). It follows that this solution also provides a measure of popularity since a

policy that is not an equilibrium outcome is preferred less compared to another policy and is therefore

Pr

unpopular.
4
Recent studies (see, for instance, Bleier et al. (2021), Singanayagam et al. (2021), and Schiavone
et al. (2021)) showing that adenovirus and mRNA candidate vaccines demonstrated persistent SARS-Cov2

3
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ence structure are critical for the existence of a stable vaccine allocation. In Theorem 2,
we introduce a new notion of a stability index, which corresponds to the minimum number

of vaccine doses which guarantees the existence of a stable vaccine allocation. This index
provides a structural characterization of the set of stable allocations, as it only depends
on the prevailing influence structure. A corollary of these findings is that, from a vaccine
allocation problem for which the number of vaccine doses available corresponds to the
stability index, we can deduce all the stable allocations for any greater number of vaccine

ev

doses. As an application of our theory, Proposition 1 derives a closed-form expression of

the stability index for vaccine allocations in the class of symmetrically weighted political
economies.

er
r

Given the limited supply of vaccine doses, we also address the question of how individual influence (or a priori voting rights) in a political economy could affect priority in
access to a vaccine. Different approaches to the measurement of influence in voting have
been proposed in the literature.5 A classical measure is the so-called influence relation.

pe

An agent i is said to have more influence than another agent j if whenever j is replaced
by i in an influential (or a winning) coalition, the resulting coalition remains influential.
The influence relation, like other classical voting power measures, is therefore a measure
of “a priori” voting power. We know very little about whether this measure translate into

ot

the ability to bring about a social outcome that maximizes individual preferences (Pongou
& Tchantcho, 2021). In Proposition 2, we show that, if agent i is at least as influential
as j, then, i can replace j in any stable allocation without compromising the allocation’s

tn

stability. In other words, more influential individuals have greater access to vaccine. For
robustness, we use another measure of a priori influence—partner-dependence—to confirm
this relationship. An agent k is partner-dependent of another agent i when any influential

rin

coalition containing k also contains i. In Proposition 3, we show that when the number
of vaccine doses available is the stability index (or the minimum number that guarantees
virus in nasal swabs despite preventing COVID-19 disease justify selfish preferences for these vaccines. In

ep

simple words, a fully COVID-19 vaccinated individual can be infected from SARS-Cov2 and can transmit
the virus. Thus, currently, the COVID-19 vaccination mainly has private benefits because I am only
protecting myself from becoming sick if I am vaccinated.
5
For a general discussion on voting power, we refer the reader to Shapley & Shubik (1954), Isbell

Pr

(1958), Taylor et al. (1999), Tchantcho et al. (2008), Pongou & Tchantcho (2021) and Freixas & Pons
(2021), among many others.

4
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existence of a stable allocation), a stable allocation that contains agent i cannot con-

tain another agent k which is partner-dependent of i. Propositions 2 and 3 imply that

individuals that have more a priori voting power have higher priority access to the vaccine.
We extend the analysis to societies characterized by varying spatial proximity between

individuals who have in-group preferences. Such preferences could be explained by altruism towards in-group individuals, or by the fact that certain vaccines have positive

externalities; that is, individuals’ vulnerability to infection decreases more if their closer

ev

neighbors are vaccinated. In these economies, preferences are unselfish due to positive

vaccine externalities. Networks offer an alternative approach to representing the relationships between agents. We therefore add a spatial dimension to the vaccine allocation

er
r

game. Spatial preferences come from the positions of agents in the metric space used to
represent and analyze proximity between agents. In this environment, Theorem 3 characterizes the set of stable allocations. In line with our analysis for selfish societies, we
provide in Corollary 1, a spatial stability index, which corresponds to the minimum num-

pe

ber of vaccine doses which guarantees the existence of a stable vaccine allocation in a
spatial vaccine allocation problem. In a practical application of our theory, we consider a
network polarized community consisting of a majority and a minority group. We find that
stable policies exist, but they may not be minority-inclusive in the sense that they may not

ot

allocate a vaccine dose to any agent in the minority group. Unless the supply of vaccine
doses exceeds a certain threshold, stable allocations only allocate vaccines to members
of the majority group. Additionally, inclusive policies pursued in such environments may

tn

not be stable. The central insight from this application is that, unless they can secure a
sufficiently large number of vaccine doses, a social planner who desires to be fair while
preserving their popularity will be unable to find solutions that satisfy both of these goals.

rin

Contributions to the Related Literature. To our best knowledge, our analysis
proposes the first model of resource allocation in a political economy in which the social
planner’s goal is to preserve their popularity. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions

ep

under which the planner’s problem can be solved. While our analysis focuses on vaccine
allocation, our results extend to the allocation of any scarce good in a political economy
context. However, our application to vaccines is timely, given the current COVID-19
pandemic. In this application, we distinguish situations in which vaccines provide only

Pr

private benefits, therefore justifying selfish preferences, and situations where vaccines

5
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carry positive externalities. We also address the question of how a priori voting rights
affect access to vaccine. All of our results are original.

We view our work as contributing to several literatures. We add to the literature on the

allocation of discrete goods. Several approaches to distributing such resources have been

considered. The random solution is one such approach. Applied to the vaccine problem,
it consists of randomly choosing µ individuals in N to receive a vaccine dose. This
approach and its variations (Price, 1958; Dahl, 1970; Mueller et al., 1972) do not consider

ev

structural and individual factors that could be essential for a planner to achieve a stable
allocation of resources. Another literature, that is more recent, addresses the problem of
optimally allocating vaccines during a pandemic to satisfy a set of other objectives related

er
r

to demographics and occupations. Some studies suggest using vaccine efficacy (Kirwin
et al., 2021; Matrajt et al., 2021; Singanayagam et al., 2021), cost-benefit analyses by
coupling epidemiological and economic models (Mylius et al., 2008; Medlock & Galvani,
2009; Matrajt et al., 2013; Duijzer et al., 2018; Rao & Brandeau, 2021), mechanism

pe

design (Westerink-Duijzer et al., 2020; Xue & Ouellette, 2020; Akbarpour et al., 2021;
Pathak et al., 2021; Castillo et al., 2021), and ethics (Yi & Marathe, 2015; Wu et al.,
2020; Emanuel et al., 2020; Nichol & Mermin-Bunnell, 2021; Pathak et al., 2021). These
studies show that the nature of epidemics, human characteristics, and market conditions

ot

are essential in implementing optimal vaccine allocations. We add to this literature the
notion that leader popularity matters in a political setting where a leader is evaluated
based on how well they manage a pandemic. Our main contribution highlights that

tn

the composition of a society in terms of the distribution of political influence (I) and
technology (supplying µ) are valuable tools that can help political leaders enhance their
popularity from implementing stable vaccine allocations.

rin

Our study is also related to the literature that uses tools from voting environments
to solve allocation problems. Examples of such problems include, but are not limited to,
the apportionment and proportional representation problems (Johnston, 1983; Balinski &

ep

Laraki, 2007; Florek, 2012; Brill et al., 2018; Jones et al., 2020), and the claim problems
(Ju et al., 2007; Flores-Szwagrzak, 2015). Classical voting models that use the core
(Gillies, 1959) as a solution concept do not account for the patterns of relationships
between voters. Our modeling of unselfish societies does. In this respect, we are closer to

Pr

the coalition structure model introduced by Aumann & Dreze (1974). We however differ

6
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from these studies in our scope, analysis and empirical implications.

The unselfish society model that we propose is inspired by the spatial framework. In
this approach, we assume that each agent i ∈ N is associated with an (ideal) point q i in a
Euclidean space of dimension m ≥ 1. The Euclidean preference assumption is that agents

are more attracted to allocations near their ideal points. Several studies are related to the
core and its variants in the spatial framework. We can quote, inter alia, the usual spatial

core (Plott, 1967; Davis et al., 1972), the epsilon-core (Shubik & Wooders, 1983; Eban

ev

& Stephen, 1990; Tovey, 2010, 1991; Bräuninger, 2007), the heart (Schofield, 1995),

the soul (Austen-Smith, 1996), the delta-core (M. Martin & Tovey, 2021), the minmax
or Simpson-Kramer point (Kramer, 1977), the strong point or Copeland winner (Owen,

er
r

1990), the yolk (McKelvey, 1986; Ferejohn et al., 1984), and the finagle point (Wuffle
et al., 1989). Again, while our work shares some features of these models, our main
research question is different. In a spatial framework, we characterize the set of stable
vaccine allocations and derive implications for how the supply of vaccine doses can affect

pe

both the stability and inclusiveness of possible vaccine allocations.

We also contribute to a recent literature on how a priori voting rights affect the ability
to induce social outcomes that maximize own preferences. There is a large and growing
literature on the measurement of a priori voting power (Shapley & Shubik, 1954; Isbell,

ot

1958; Banzhaf III, 1964; Taylor et al., 1999; Lambo & Moulen, 2002; Tchantcho et al.,
2008; Kurz et al., 2017, 2021; Freixas & Pons, 2021). This literature does not address
the question of whether a priori power reflects the ability to affect social outcomes. This

tn

question has been addressed in a few studies (Diffo Lambo & Moulen, 2000; Lambo et al.,
2012; Pongou & Tchantcho, 2021). While our study partly addresses a similar question,
we note that our setting is different.

rin

The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the general
problem of vaccine allocation. Section 3 addresses the problem of the existence and
characterization of stable vaccine allocations when agents are selfish. Section 4 addresses

ep

the same problem when agents are unselfish (or organized into distinct groups and have

Pr

in-group preferences). Section 5 offers concluding remarks.

7
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2

General Framework of Vaccine Allocation Games

To formalize the notion of a vaccine allocation game, we need several intermediate concepts and assumptions.

2.1

Allocations and Preferences

ev

For any non-zero integer n, let N = {1, ..., n} be a finite set of agents. A coalition

is any nonempty subset of agents; 2N refers to the set of coalitions and |S| refers to
the cardinality of any coalition S. There are µ available doses of a vaccine, where µ

er
r

is a non-zero integer. Given N and µ, an allocation of the µ doses to agents is any
S ⊆ N such |S| ≤ µ, where |S| denotes the cardinality of S. Therefore, we denote
N (µ) = {S ⊆ N : |S| ≤ µ} the set of allocations. Each agent has a preference relation
over the set N (µ) which is a weak ordering over N (µ). We denote agent i’s preferences
by -i , the relation ≺i denotes the strict portion of -i , and the relation ∼i denotes the

pe

indifference portion of -i . We denote by (-i ) a preference profile over N (µ). In this first
part of our model, which is more general, we do not impose any additional assumptions
on agents’ preferences. For example, it is not assumed that all agents desire to receive
a vaccine dose; it might happen that an agent i prefers not being vaccinated over being

ot

vaccinated and another agent j prefers being vaccinated over being unvaccinated. Next,

2.2

tn

we introduce the concept of an influence structure.

Influence Structures

Generally, governments and citizens face different challenges during a pandemic than they

rin

do in regular times. Producing a vaccine that may reduce adverse effects on health and
economic conditions is a rare event in many societies. Those who succeed in developing
a new vaccine face an allocation problem at the onset of its production. This problem

ep

generally arises from the fact that the social planner (or decision-makers) and citizens
eligible to receive vaccines have misaligned preferences. Generally, political leaders avoid
implementing policies that may result in them becoming unpopular with citizens, signifi-

Pr

cant donors, and other interest groups.6 Since political leaders care about maximizing the
6

For more information on how interests groups influence policymakers’ decisions, we refer the reader

to Dellis & Oak (2019); also, a recent study by Dellis (2021) describes the literature on legislative

8
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power wielded by themselves and their political party, democratic leaders avoid becoming

unpopular as it increases the probability of an electoral loss for the leader or their party.

Though weaker in autocratic societies, the incentive to prevent unpopularity still exists.
Although leaders in autocratic societies don’t have to face electoral backlash, unpopular

policies still increase the risk of civil wars, revolutions, and other conflicts which may result
in government instability or leaders’ death.

We will refer to any group able to influence the popularity of a leader (and therefore

ev

the vaccine allocation) as an influential coalition. When developing an allocation strategy,
any social planner must design a vaccine allocation solution that only proposes stable
outcomes, i.e., allocations that will not be successfully challenged by any influential coali-

er
r

tion.7 We denote the set of influential coalitions by I. Throughout the study, we call I,
the influence structure. Each coalition S ∈ I has the ability to veto out any proposed
allocation in N (µ) regardless of the preferences of agents outside of S. Non-influential
coalitions (i.e., all S ∈
/ I) do not have this veto power. We will assume that I satisfies

pe

the following two conditions:
(1) ∅ ∈
/ I and I =
6 ∅

ot

(2) for all coalitions S and T , if S ∈ I and S ⊆ T , then T ∈ I.
Both assumptions (1) and (2) are natural. According to assumption (1), an empty
coalition can’t influence the allocation of vaccines. Assumption (1) also states that at

tn

least one influential coalition exists. Assumption (2) is a monotonicity condition which
stipulates that the addition of new agents to an influential coalition yields another influential coalition. The two assumptions together imply that the entire community, N , is an

rin

influential coalition.

An influence structure is said to be weighted if the following two conditions hold.

ep

• There exist a real number q called quota, with 0 < q ≤ n.
• For all i ∈ N , there exists a non-negative weight αi such that for all subset S of
P
N , S ∈ I if and only if
αi ≥ q.
i∈S

Pr

informational lobbying.
7
In other words, a stable vaccine allocation is one that is not unpopular.

9
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In this case, we denote I ≡ I(q) = [q; α1 , ..., αn ]. A weighted influence structure is

symmetrical if all agents have the same weight, which by normalization is αi = 1, for
each i ∈ N . We introduce below a formal definition of a political economy, a vaccine
allocation problem, and a vaccine allocation game.

2.3

Political Economies and Vaccine Allocation Games

ev

Throughout the study, a political economy is a pair E = (N, I), and the couple V =

(E, µ) is referred to as a vaccine allocation problem. A vaccine allocation game, which
we denote G, is any pair G = hV, (-i )i, where (-i ) is a preference profile over N (µ).

er
r

Sometimes, we will also write a vaccine allocation game as G = hN, I, µ, (-i )i. We
denote by V the set of all vaccine allocation games. Next, we provide the definition of a
stable allocation of vaccines.

Stable Allocations of Vaccines

pe

2.4

Let V = (E, µ) be a vaccine allocation problem, X and Y be two allocations in N (µ). In
the vaccine allocation game G = hV, (-i )i, we denote by P (X, Y, (-i )) := {i ∈ N \X : X ≺i Y },
the set of agents who prefer allocation Y to X. The following definition introduces the

ot

stability concept in our model of vaccine allocation.
Definition 1. Let G = hN, I, µ, (-i )i be a vaccine allocation game, and X and Y be

tn

two allocations in N (µ).

1. Y challenges X (i.e., Y is more popular than X) if P (X, Y, (-i )) is an influential
coalition, i.e, P (X, Y, (-i )) ∈ I .

rin

2. X is challenged (i.e., is unpopular) if, there is an allocation Y that challenges X.
3. A stable allocation is an allocation that is not challenged.
4. The core of the vaccine allocation game, denoted C(G), consists of all stable

ep

allocations.8

In the following examples, we illustrate the notion of the core of a vaccine allocation

game.

In other words, the core of a vaccine allocation game is the set of all vaccine allocations that are

Pr

8

not unpopular. Leaders who implement allocation policies that do not belong to the core will lose their
popularity, if judged only by how well they perform on the vaccine allocation problem.

10
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Example 1. Consider a set of five individuals, N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, working for three
different firms denoted A, B and C. These firms offer different services, and interactions

between individuals and firms are described as follows: A = {1, 2, 3}; B = {2, 4}; and
C = {3, 5} (also, see Figure 1). In other words, individual 1 only works for firm A, and

er
r

ev

individual 2 works for two firms, A and B.

pe

Figure 1: Representation of firms and services in the community
Assume that the supply of vaccine is limited, and therefore, not all the individuals in
a firm can be vaccinated in the same period. How can a social planner solve the vaccine
allocation problem? One approach which is widely used in the real-world consists of having

ot

an appropriate institution with the support of independent experts analyze the severity
of the pandemic in different communities, then use this information to recommending
vaccine priority.9 This method of prioritization deals with the problem of vaccine scarcity

tn

while following some basic ethical principles such as: maximizing benefits and minimizing
harms, mitigating health inequities, promoting fair access to the vaccine, and allowing for
transparency in the allocation process. Assuming that agents in a group have some set

rin

of common characteristics which can used for analysis by institutions, an example of this
prioritization policy could include agents in group A being offered vaccines first (because
the nature of firm A services exposes its workers to a higher infection risk), followed by

ep

firm B, and then by firm C. It is essential to point out that the recommended priority
9

For some recent proposals on vaccine prioritization, see, for instance, Persad et al. (2020), Pathak

et al. (2021), Pollard & Bijker (2021), Han et al. (2021), World Health Organization (2021), Akbarpour
et al. (2021), and the references therein. Currently, several countries are recommending eligible groups

Pr

of individuals to a third COVID-19 vaccine shot (see, for example, Furlong & Deutsh (2021) and Anne
Arundel County Department of Health (2021)).

11
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decision is often made through bargaining and deliberation. In this context, individuals

or firms can use their personal or economic power in the community to influence the

allocation of the limited vaccine doses. It follows then that a society’s influence structure

will play a role in determining the set of agents who are likely to receive the vaccine first.
Following this discussion, we assume that a coalition is influential if it consists of more

than half of the size of a firm. For instance, {1, 2} (more than half of the size of firm
A) is influential while {1, 5} is not. In general, it follows that I contains coalitions S

ev

such that |S ∩ {1, 2, 3}| ≥ 2 or {2, 4} ⊆ S or {3, 5} ⊆ S. Remark that any influential
coalition contains at least one of the two individuals working for two different firms, 2
and 3, which implies that these individuals have more power to influence the allocation of

er
r

vaccines. We consider the preference profile (-i ), such that for all allocations X and Y :




X
≺
Y,
if
i
∈
Y
\X


i
 X ≺i Y, if i ∈ X\Y

∀i ∈ N \ {3} , Y ≺i X, if i ∈ X\Y and for i = 3, Y ≺i X, if i ∈ Y \X




 X ∼ Y, otherwise
 X ∼ Y, otherwise
i

i

pe

According to these preferences, individuals 1, 2, 4 and 5 have a positive attitude towards
vaccine since they would like to be vaccinated, unlike individual 3 who has a negative
attitude towards vaccination. Let (-i ) be the preference profile given above, and let
E = (N, I) be a political economy. This situation can formally be analyzed using the

ot

vaccine allocation game G = hE, µ, (-i )i, where µ ≤ 5. We provide the set C(E, µ) of
stable vaccine allocations for different values of µ.

tn

• C(E, 1) = {{i} : i ∈ N \ {3}};

• C(E, 2) = {{2} , {1, 2} , {1, 4} , {2, 4} , {2, 5}};
• C(E, 3) = C(E, 2) ∪ {{1, 2, 4} , {1, 2, 5} , {1, 4, 5} , {2, 4, 5}};

rin

• C(E, 4) = C(E, 3) ∪ {{1, 2, 4, 5} , {1, 2, 3, 5}}; and
• C(E, 5) = C(E, 3) ∪ {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}.
We note that when µ ≤ 3, agent 3 does not receive a vaccine dose in any stable

ep

allocation. Indeed, if agent 3 receives a dose of vaccine in an allocation X, then at least
one agent j of {1, 2, 5} must not receive a dose of vaccine. There is an allocation Y that
challenges X via the influential structure {j, 3}; consider any allocation Y that contains
j but does not contain 3. Note also that when µ = 5, the stable allocation {1, 2, 3, 5}

Pr

reserves a vaccine dose for the hesitant agent 3 at the expense of agent 4 who, unlike 3,
would like to be vaccinated.
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Example 2. Consider a vaccine allocation game G = hN, I(2), µ, (-i )i, where N =

{1, 2, 3, 4}, I(2) = [2; 1, 1, 1, 1] is a weighted symmetrical influence structure, µ = 2,
and (-i ) are the agents’ preferences. If all the agents have a positive attitude towards

vaccine, we show that the core C(G) is empty, that is, C(G) = ∅. If only agent 4 has a
negative attitude towards vaccine, then, C(G) = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 3}}.

Example 3. Consider a political economy E = (N, I(3)), where N = {1, ..., 6}, and

ev

I(3) = [3; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]. We assume that agent i ∈ N has an ideal position denoted, q i ,

in the usual Euclidean plane, with q i 6= q j when i 6= j; see Figure 2. We derive agents’
preference profile (-i ) from their ideal positions so that for all allocations X and Y ,




we have X -i Y if min d q i , q k ≤ min d q i , q l , where d is the usual Euclidean
l∈X

er
r

k∈Y

ot

pe

distance.

tn

Figure 2: Illustration of an unselfish community in a spatial setting. The positions of
agents in both Figures 2-(a) and 2-(b) form a regular hexagon.

rin

• For µ = 1, any allocation in the vaccine allocation game G = (E, µ, (-i )) can
be challenged, yielding an empty core. For instance, the allocation X = {5} is
challenged by Y = {2} via {1, 2, 3}; see Figure 2-(a). Indeed, for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3},

ep

d (q i , q 2 ) < d (q i , q 5 ).

• For µ = 2, the set of stable allocations in G = (E, µ, (-i )) becomes non-empty.

Pr

For instance, we show that X = {2, 5} ∈ C(G). If we consider an influential
coalition S, it is not possible to find an allocation Y that collectively improves the
preferences of the members of S with respect to X; see Figure 2-(b).
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Though a stable vaccine allocation always exists in Example 1, this is not necessarily
the case in Example 2 or Example 3. A natural question therefore arises: What conditions

guarantee the existence of a stable vaccine allocation? This question is pertinent because
if a stable vaccine allocation does not exist in a political economy, then any chosen
allocation policy will be unpopular. Throughout the remaining of the study, we assume
that agents have positive attitude towards vaccines. We address this issue in Sections
3 and 4. In Section 3, we assume that agents have selfish preferences in the sense that

ev

being vaccinated brings more utility to an agent. In this environment, agents only care

about themselves. Agents’ preferences in Example 2 illustrate such a selfish environment.
In Section 4, we assume instead that agents are unselfish, i.e., they also care about others

er
r

who are closer to them. We illustrate such a society using a spatial model in Example 4.

3

Stable Vaccine Allocations in Selfish Societies

pe

In this section, we analyze the existence of stable vaccine allocations in an environment
where agents are selfish. Selfish preferences in the context of vaccination are generally
widespread in the early production stage of vaccines during pandemics. These preferences
often induce social planners or policymakers to implement conservative and protectionist

ot

policies in the production and distribution of vaccines. This phenomenon is known as
vaccine nationalism (see, for example, Bollyky & Bown (2020), Eaton (2021), and Katz
et al. (2021)), a common situation where powerful countries deploy enough resources to

tn

secure vaccines and therapeutics at the expense of less-wealthy countries. Most people
will not support a social planner who supplies vaccine doses to another country when
the pandemic is not yet contained at home. Therefore, we might expect leaders to

rin

face tenuous challenges in allocating a limited supply of vaccines in selfish democratic
communities where politicians seek popularity and re-election.
The main objective of each agent is to be among the first to receive a vaccine dose.

ep

Consequently, an agent prefers an allocation X to an allocation Y if X provides a vaccine
dose to that agent and Y does not. An agent is indifferent between X and Y if they
receive a vaccine dose in both allocations, or if neither allocation gives them a dose. The

Pr

formal definition is below.
Definition 2. Let V = (E, µ) be a vaccine allocation problem, X and Y be two alloca14
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tions in N (µ). Agent i’s preferences -i over N (µ) are selfish if the following hold.
1. Agent i prefers Y over X (or X ≺i Y ) if i ∈ Y \X.

2. Agent i is indifferent between X and Y (or X ∼i Y ) if i ∈ (X ∩ Y ) or i ∈
/
(X ∪ Y ).

3. Agent i weakly prefers Y over X (or X -i Y ), if X ≺i Y or X ∼i Y .

Without loss of generality, we assume that µ ≤ n. It is straightforward that, if a

ev

stable allocation X is such as |X| < µ, then, by allocating the remainder of vaccine doses
available to the agents chosen in any way in N \X, the new induced allocation remains

stable. In addition, the agents have a positive attitude towards vaccines by assumption.

3.1

er
r

Therefore, we only consider efficient allocations i.e., N (µ) = {S ⊆ N : |S| = µ}.

Characterization of Stable Vaccine Allocations in Selfish Societies: Minimum Number of Vaccine Doses

pe

We will now tackle the existence problem for stable allocations with a given number
of vaccine doses. We already know from Example 2 that a stable allocation may not
exist in a society where citizens are selfish. Our goal is to determine conditions under
which a stable allocation always exists in such societies. In particular, we determine the

ot

minimum number of vaccine doses that guarantees the existence of a stable allocation.
This is equivalent to finding a threshold number µ∗ such that for any µ ≥ µ∗ , we have
a non-empty core for a corresponding vaccine allocation game G = hE, µ, (-i )i. Such

tn

a minimal integer is justified given that the scarcity of a resource increases with its cost.
Therefore, social planners can approve of a vaccine during a pandemic when the suppliers
guarantee the production of the minimum supply of doses µ∗ . Notice that the latter

rin

decision might depend on several characteristics of the society, including the preferences
and responsibilities of the planners towards their constituents and special interest groups.
In Example 1, we can show that µ∗ = 1. More generally, we will prove the existence of

ep

such a number µ∗ in any given political economy E = (N, I).
Let N∗ be the set of non-zero integers. For any political economy E = (N, I), let
HE = {k ∈ N∗ : ∀t ≥ k, ∃T ∈ N (t) , ∀S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ t, then, S ∩ T 6= ∅},

Pr

where N (t) = {S ⊆ N : |S| = t}. Obviously, HE 6= ∅ since |N | = n ∈ HE . We define
the stability index as follows.
15
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Definition 3. The stability index of a political economy E = (N, I), denoted µ∗ (E), is
defined as µ∗ (E) := min(HE ).

We shall prove that the stability index is essential to the determination of the stability
of vaccine allocations in a selfish community. Before deriving the stability index, we first
prove the following result.

Theorem 1. Let G = hN, I, µ, (-i )i be a vaccine allocation game, and let X ∈ N (µ)

ev

be an allocation. Assume that each agent i’s preferences -i over N (µ) are selfish. Then
:

Proof. We proceed by double implications.

er
r

X ∈ C(G) if and only if for any S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ µ then, X ∩ S 6= ∅.

⇒) Let X ∈ C(G) and let us show that for any S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ µ then, X ∩ S 6= ∅.
For this purpose, consider such a coalition S, and assume that |S| ≤ µ and X ∩ S 6= ∅.
Let T be a subset of µ−|S| elements of N \S, and consider the allocation Y = S ∪T . It is

pe

obvious that S ⊆ P (X, Y ); since S is an influential coalition, it follows that Y challenges
X via S, which contradicts the assumption that X is a stable allocation. We have shown
that for any S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ µ, then X ∩ S 6= ∅.

⇐) Assume that for any S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ µ, then X ∩ S 6= ∅. We need to show

ot

that X cannot be challenged in the allocation game G. Assume that X is challenged
by another allocation Y ∈ N (µ). It follows that P (X, Y ) ∈ I. Naturally, we have two

tn

cases, either |P (X, Y )| > µ or |P (X, Y )| ≤ µ. If |P (X, Y )| > µ, then according to
the definition, it is not possible that X is challenged by Y , because Y ∈ N (µ) implies
|Y | = µ. Therefore, |P (X, Y )| ≤ µ, and by assumption, X ∩ P (X, Y ) 6= ∅, which is
impossible. In fact, let i ∈ X ∩ P (X, Y ). Then, agent i prefers X to Y , and Y to X, i.e,

rin

X ≺i Y ≺i X or X ≺i X (since the preference ≺i is transitive), which is a contradiction.
Hence, allocation X ∈ C(G).

ep

Theorem 1 states that an allocation is in the core if it contains at least one member of
each influential coalition whose size does not exceed µ. Overall, this result conveys a key

message: any allocation of vaccine to µ agents in the community cannot be challenged
so long as memberships in influential coalitions are costly. What we mean by cost is the

Pr

capacity to gather a large number of agents in order to form an influential coalition. In fact,
it is implied from the statements in Theorem 1, that, if the influence structure of the society
16
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is such that only coalitions which consist of more than µ agents can impact the allocation
process of vaccines (i.e., S ∈ I if and only if |S| > µ), then any allocation in N (µ)
is stable: C(G) = N (µ). This situation happens not because of agents’ unwillingness

to challenge allocations, but simply because successful challenges require a significant
degree of adhesion from members in the society. We have stable allocations because of

the limited number of resources that prevents bargaining. This is similar to the concept of
“abstention due to alienation;” see Zipp (1985), Plane & Gershtenson (2004), and Adams

ev

et al. (2006).

Definition 4. A vaccine allocation game hN, I, µ, (-i )i has a stable horizon if for any

The main result of this section follows.

er
r

integer µ ≥ µ, the game hN, I, µ, (-i )i has a non-empty core.

Theorem 2. Let E = (N, I) be a political economy. For any integer µ and selfish
if and only if µ ≥ µ∗ (E).

pe

preference profile (-i ), the vaccine allocation game G = hE, µ, (-i )i has a stable horizon

Proof. ⇒) Assume that G = hE, µ, (-i )i has a stable horizon, we must show that
µ ≥ µ∗ (E). Since µ∗ (E) is the smallest element of HE , it is sufficient to show that

ot

µ ∈ HE . For this purpose, let t ≥ µ, by assumption, G has a stable horizon thus, the core
of the vaccine allocation game Gt = hE, t, (-i )i is non-empty. Let X ∈ C (Gt ) ⊆ N (t),
Theorem 1 ensures that: for any S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ t then, S ∩ X 6= ∅. It follows that

tn

µ ∈ HE and therefore µ ≥ µ∗ (E).

⇐) Conversely, assume that µ ≥ µ∗ (E) and show that G = hE, µ, (-i )i has a stable
horizon. Let µ ≥ µ, we have µ ≥ µ∗ (E) and by definition of HE , there is T ∈ N (µ)

rin

such that for any S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ µ, then, S ∩ T 6= ∅. According to Theorem 1, T is
a stable allocation for the vaccine allocation game Gµ = hE, µ, (-i )i, i.e., T ∈ C(Gµ ).
The latter completes the proof.

ep

When there is no ambiguity, for any political economy E = (N, I), and any selfish

preference profile (-i ), we denote by G∗ = hE, µ∗ , (-i )i, with µ∗ = µ∗ (E), the vaccine
allocation game with a stable horizon that requires the smallest number of vaccine doses.

Pr

In Proposition 1, we provide the stability index for the class of symmetrically weighted
political economies. Precisely, we show that the stability index for a q-weighted symmetric
17
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political economy E = (N, I(q)) is given by µ∗ (E) = n−q+1 if q ≤ n2 , and by µ∗ (E) = 1

if q > n2 . A corollary of this finding is that when the quota exceeds half of the total number
of agents (simple majority rule), then all the vaccine allocations are stable for any number
of doses.

ev

Proposition 1. Let E = (N, I(q)) be a symmetric(
weighted political economy with quota
µ∗ (E) = n − q + 1 if q ≤ n2
q < n. Then, the stability index of E is given by:
.
µ∗ (E) = 1 if q > n2
Proof. We differentiate two cases.
• Case 1 : q ≤

n
.
2

If µ∗ 6= n − q + 1, then we have either µ∗ < n − q + 1 or

er
r

µ∗ > n − q + 1. Assume that µ∗ < n − q + 1 and let t = n − q ≥ µ∗ . By
assumption, there exists T ∈ N (t) such that for any S ∈ I(q), if |S| ≤ t, then
S ∩ T 6= ∅. For such a coalition T , we have |N \T | = q. Moreover, q ≤

n
2

is

equivalent to q ≤ n − q = t. Given that I(q) is a weighted influence structure with

pe

quota q, it follows that S = N \T is an influential coalition such that |S| ≤ t and
S ∩ T = ∅. This is in contradiction with the initial assumption that µ∗ < n − q + 1.
Thus, we can conclude that µ∗ ≥ n − q + 1. To show that µ∗ ≤ n − q + 1, we
consider the coalition T = {i ∈ N : i ≤ n − q + 1}. It holds that |T | = n − q + 1

ot

and |N \T | = q − 1. Moreover, any influential coalition S contains at least q agents,
and consequently, S cannot be contained in N \T . Thus S ∩ T 6= ∅, which proves

tn

that µ∗ ≤ n − q + 1. We can conclude that µ∗ = n − q + 1.
• Case 2 : q > n2 . To show that µ∗ = 1, it is sufficient to show that for any t ≥ 1,
there is T ∈ N (t) such that for any S ∈ I, if |S| ≤ t, then S ∩ T 6= ∅. Indeed,
n
,
2

then there is no coalition S ∈ I(q) such that |S| ≤ t. If t >

rin

if t ≤

take T = {i ∈ N : i ≤ t}. Since |S| = t >

n
,
2

it follows that |N \T | ≤

n
,
2
n
2

just
< q

and therefore, no influential coalition can be included in N \T , i.e., any influential

Pr

ep

coalition intersects T . This is especially true for S ∈ I(q) such that |S| ≤ t.

18
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3.2

Stable Vaccine Allocations and Individual Influence in a Political Economy

In this section, we ask how, in circumstances of scarce resources, individual influence (or
voting power) in a political economy affects priority in access to vaccines. For simplicity,
given that preferences are fixed, we will represent the core of the vaccine allocation game

G = hN, µ, I, (-i )i by C(G) = C(E, µ), where E = (N, I). Consider the following

ev

example, which illustrates the problem we aim to solve in this section.

Example 4. The allocation problem studied in Example 4 is similar to that in Example

er
r

1, with the exception that agents now have selfish preferences. We recall that N =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and I = {S ⊆ N : {2, 4} ⊆ S or {3, 5} ⊆ S or |S ∩ {1, 2, 3}| ≥ 2}.
• If µ = 1 then, any allocation is stable and C(E, 1) = {{i} : i ∈ N }. Indeed, we need
at least two individuals from the same firm to form an influential coalition to challenge an
allocation. Since there is only one resource unit, any individual can get it. In fact, nobody

pe

has an incentive to cooperate with another individual from the same firm to challenge
an allocation since doing so can only increase the utility of one member of the coalition,
leaving the other member’s utility unchanged.

• If µ = 2, we show that X = {2, 3} is the unique stable allocation. Each of individuals

ot

2 and 3 belong to two firms, making them more influential than individuals 1, 4, and 5.
The priority given to them in terms of accessing the vaccine is therefore in line with the

tn

influence structure of the society.

• If µ = 3, we show that C(E, 3) = {{1, 2, 3} , {2, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 5}}.
• If µ = 4, C(E, 4) = {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 4, 5} , {1, 2, 3, 5}}.

rin

• If µ = 5, the unique stable allocation is the entire community, i.e., C(E, 5) = {N }.
It follows from this example that stable allocations depend on preference structure. We
note, for example that when the number of doses is at least equal to 2, both individuals 2

ep

and 3 receive a vaccine dose; this is not the case in Example 1 where 3 is strongly opposed
to vaccination.
We also note that when the number of vaccine doses is at least equal to 2, individuals

2 and 3 are given a vaccine dose in all stable allocations. However, there exist stable

Pr

allocations where other individuals are not given any doses. This observation reveals that
individuals 2 and 3 are more influential (or have higher voting power) than the other
19
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individuals (see, for example, Taylor et al. (1999), Tchantcho et al. (2008), Pongou &

Tchantcho (2021) and Freixas & Pons (2021)). We will generalize this insight below.
First, we need to introduce the notions of individual influence and partner-dependence in
a political economy.

Definition 5. Let E = (N, I) be a political economy, and let i, j and k be three agents.

ev

1. Agent i is at least as influential as agent j in E when, for any S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, if
S ∪ {j} ∈ I then, S ∪ {i} ∈ I.

er
r

2. Agent k is partner-dependent of agent i when for any S ∈ I, if k ∈ S then, i ∈ S.
An individual i is at least as influential as another individual j if whenever j can turn a
non-influential coalition S (not containing i and j) into an influential coalition by joining
it, i can turn a non-influential coalition into an influential one by doing the same. An
individual k is partner-dependent of another individual i if, whenever k belongs to an

pe

influential coalition S, i also belongs to S. The notion of partner-dependence reflects
a certain correlation in the membership of influential coalitions. The dependent agent
cannot belong to an influential coalition without their partners. Note that if k is partnerdependent of agent i, then i is at least as influential as agent k, but the converse is not

ot

true,

To illustrate these notions, consider the influence structure in Example 1. Agent 3 is

tn

at least as influential as agents 1 and 5; likewise, agent 2 is at least as influential as agents
1 and 4. Note that the converse is not true, as agents 1 and 5 are not as influential as
agent 3 and agents 1 and 4 are not as influential as agent 2. Also note that, agent 4 is
partner-dependent of agent 2 and, agent 5 is partner-dependent of agent 3.

rin

For any agent i ∈ N , denote by C i (G) = {X ∈ C(E, µ) : i ∈ X} the set of core
allocations in the game G = hE, µi that contain i. The following result shows that the

ep

core is consistent with the structure of individual influence among agents in a game.
Proposition 2. Let G = hN, µ, Ii be a vaccine allocation game and X ∈ N (µ) be an
allocation. Let i, j ∈ N be such that i is at least as influential as j. The following

Pr

statements hold.
1. For any X ∈ C(G), if j ∈ X and i ∈
/ X then, (X\ {j}) ∪ {i} ∈ C(G).
20
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2. |C j (G)| ≤ |C i (G)|. In particular, if for any X ∈ C(G), we have i ∈
/ X, then for
all X ∈ C(G), we also have j ∈
/ X.

Proof. 1. Assume that i is at least as influential as j and consider an allocation X such

that j ∈ X and i ∈
/ X. We need to show that Z = (X\ {j}) ∪ {i} is a stable allocation.
It is sufficient to show that no allocation challenges Z. Let Y be an allocation. Since X

is stable, Y does not challenge X, that is the set P (X, Y ) := N \X is not an influential

ev

coalition. By definition, P (Z, Y ) := N \ ((X\ {j}) ∪ {i}) = N \ (X ∪ {i}) ∪ {j}. Let
S = N \ (X ∪ {i}). It is straightforward that S ⊆ N \ {i, j} and S ∪ {i} = N \X =
P (X, Y ) is not an influential coalition. Since i is at least as influential as j, S ∪ {j} =

er
r

N \ (X ∪ {i}) ∪ {j} = P (Z, Y ) cannot be an influential coalition. We can conclude that
there is no allocation Y that can challenge Z, and so Z is a stable allocation.
2. According to the first point, the correspondence f which maps any element X of
j

C (G) to the element f (X) of C i (G), with f (X) = (X\ {j}) ∪ {i}, is well defined.
Moreover, f is an injective correspondence, thus |C j (G)| ≤ |C i (G)|. The particular

pe

situation for which no stable allocation contains i corresponds to |C i (G)| = 0. In this
case, we also have |C j (G)| = 0, which implies that no stable allocation contains j.
The first statement in Proposition 2 stipulates that the core is consistent with the

ot

influence relation among agents in any vaccine allocation game. That is, if there exists
a stable allocation that contains an agent j, then there also exists a stable allocation
that contains any agent i that is at least as influential as j. The second statement in

tn

Proposition 2 deduces naturally from the first. In fact, the second statement says that,
given two agents i and j, if agent i is at least as influential as agent j then, the core
allocations which contain agent i are at least as numerous as those which contain agent

rin

j. In other words, the likelihood that an agent gets priority in access to a vaccine is higher
if that agent is more influential.
Proposition 3 examines the case where agents have some partner-dependence relation-

ep

ship in a political economy and yields a result similar to that of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Let E = (N, I) be a political economy and X ∈ N (µ∗ ) be an allocation.

Let i and k ∈ N be two agents, with agent k being a partner-dependent of agent i. If X

Pr

belongs to the core of the vaccine allocation game G∗ = hE, µ∗ , (-i )i and i ∈ X, then
k∈
/ X.
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Proof. By assumption, µ∗ is the smallest strictly positive integer such that for any µ ≥ µ∗ ,
we have C(E, µ) 6= ∅. By contradiction, consider X ∈ C(G∗ ) such that {i, k} ⊆ X. It
is clear that µ ≥ 2. Let µ = µ∗ − 1 ≥ 1 and Y = X\ {k}. For any S ∈ I, we have

by assumption S ∩ X 6= ∅. For such a coalition S, if i ∈ S, then i ∈ S ∩ (X\ {k}),

that is, S ∩ Y 6= ∅. Otherwise, if i ∈
/ S, then k ∈
/ S; but S ∩ X 6= ∅, it follows that
S ∩ (X\ {k}) ⊇ S ∩ (X\ {i, k}) 6= ∅, that is, S ∩ Y 6= ∅. For µ = µ∗ − 1 < µ∗ , we have

Y ∈ C(E, µ) and by assumption, for any µ ≥ µ∗ , we have C(E, µ) 6= ∅. We can deduce

ev

that for any µ ≥ µ∗ − 1, we have C(E, µ) 6= ∅, which contradicts the assumption that
µ∗ is minimal.

er
r

In this section, we have assumed that agents only care about themselves in a vaccine allocation game. This consideration abstracts any information about the potential
connections or links that may exist between agents. This assumption may in fact be unrealistic, as individuals that belong to the same group, whether defined by race, profession,
or household, may have other-regarding preferences towards members of their own group

pe

for several reasons. One reason this may be the case is that members of the same group
are more likely to physically interact with each other than with those outside of the group.
Therefore, if a member of an individual’s group is vaccinated, it decreases that individual’s
vulnerability to infection, even if they are not personally vaccinated. While this is also true

ot

for those outside of an individual’s group, the individual benefits more from the vaccination
of group members, with whom they frequently interact, than they do from vaccinating

tn

outsiders, with whom they have little to no interactions. Therefore, if an individual has
to choose between two vaccine allocations X and Y to which they don’t belong, that
individual will choose the allocation that gives more vaccine doses to individuals closer to

rin

them. Moreover, two individuals may have preferences that are closer if they belong to
the same group than if they belong to different groups. In the next section, we extend
the analysis of stable allocations in a framework where agents may have some degree of
direct or indirect connections in the community. In order to simulate these connections,

ep

we add a spatial dimension to a vaccine allocation game using concepts from Euclidean
geometry. This spatial dimension captures the relationship that individuals may have with

Pr

each other.

22

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3955958

iew
ed

4

Stable Vaccine Allocations in Unselfish Societies

In the previous section we assumed that given an allocation X, an agent i is either satisfied

(i ∈ X) or not (i ∈
/ X). However, in practice, it might happen that even if agent i does
not receive the vaccine, they prefer that agent j who is “closer” to them receives it than

another agent k who is “further” from them. This is the case, for example, when vaccines
to infection when of their neighbors are vaccinated.

ev

have positive externalities in the sense that an unvaccinated individual is less vulnerable
In order to capture agents’ consideration of “closeness” in their preferences, we add a
spatial dimension to the definition of a vaccine allocation game. We assume that each

er
r

agent i ∈ N is associated with a unique (ideal) point q i in the metric space Rm of
dimension m ≥ 1. We denote by {q i }i∈N or {q i } a profile of agents’ ideal points. The
metric space is endowed with a distance d. For simplicity, we assume that for all distinct
i, j ∈ N , q i 6= q j . Therefore, agents in N are equivalent to their ideal points in {q i }i∈N ,

pe

i.e., for any allocation S ∈ N (µ), with |S| = µ, we can write S = {S 1 , ..., S µ }, a subset
of {q i }i∈N . A spatial political economy, which we denote E d , is defined as the triple
E d = (N, I, {q i }). Given a spatial political economy E d , the pair V d = (E d , µ) defines
e the domain of spatial vaccine
a spatial vaccine allocation problem. We denote by V
defined as follows.

ot

allocation problems. In an unselfish society, agents have unselfish spatial preferences

tn

Definition 6. Let V d = (E d , µ) be a spatial vaccine allocation problem, and X and Y
be two allocations in N (µ). Agent i’s preferences over N (µ), which we denote -di , are
unselfish if the following hold.

rin

1. Agent i prefers Y over X, denoted as X ≺di Y , if there exists an element j ∈ Y

such that for all k ∈ X, d (q i , q j ) < d q i , q k 10 ;
2. Agent i is indifferent between X and Y , denoted as X ∼di Y , if neither X ≺di Y
nor Y ≺di X.

ep

3. Agent i weakly prefers Y over X, denoted as X -di Y , if X ≺di Y or X ∼di Y .

We define a spatial vaccine allocation game, which we denote Gd , as an array

Pr

Gd = hN, I, {q i } , µ, (-di )i or simply Gd = hV d , (-di )i. As in the previous sections, since
10

We can also write this inequality as d(i, Y ) < d(i, X), where d(i, Z) is the distance of agent i to an

allocation Z, with d(i, Z) := min{d q i , q j : j ∈ Z}.
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preferences are fixed, we can represent the set of stable allocations of the spatial vaccine

allocation game Gd simply by C(Gd ) ≡ C(E d , µ). In the following example, we determine
the set of stable vaccine allocations in a simple spatial political economy.

Example 5. Consider a small community which consists of four juniors and three seniors.
The community is affected by a deadly respiratory virus which creates a pandemic. Relative

to juniors, seniors are more likely to get very sick from the disease and are more likely

ev

to need hospitalization, intensive care, or a ventilator to help them breathe. Additionally,

relative to juniors, seniors have a higher probability of being killed by the disease if they
catch it. Other factors, such as having certain underlying medical conditions also increase

er
r

the likelihood of dying or becoming very ill if infected by the virus. In the community,
most of these underlying medical conditions are concentrated among seniors.11 With
intensive investment in science and medical technology, a vaccine is discovered and it is
shown to be highly effective against the adverse effects caused by the virus. However,
not everyone can get a shot at the same time. The structure of the community is such

pe

that potential influential coalitions fall into one of the following categories: (1) a group
of agents that includes at least two individuals in which there is at least one senior; or
(2) a group of agents that includes at least four juniors. Such an influential coalition
can challenge any allocation of vaccines that does not satisfy some specific interests. Let

ot

J = {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the group of juniors and S = {5, 6, 7} denote the group of seniors,
so that N = J ∪ S. We assume that the number of vaccine doses µ is less than 7, the

tn

cardinality of N .

Consider the two different spatial configurations given in Figure 3. Each of the two
configurations reflects a certain proximity which induces an unselfish community.

rin

The situation can be represented in both configurations by a vaccine allocation game
whose underlying political economy (N, I(4)) is such that I corresponds to the weighted
influence structure, defined by I(4) = [4; 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3]. Notice that the weight of
each senior is three times that of a junior. Such a difference might reflect a certain

ep

priority given to seniors due to the risk severity of the virus among seniors. Within a
population with a fixed cardinality n = N , the number of influential coalitions increases

with the proportion of seniors. In other words, in an aging population, there is more

Pr

tension for access to the vaccine. For instance, in African countries where the population
11

A typical real-world example of such a scenario is COVID-19.
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Figure 3: Representation of agents’ relationships in an unselfish community
is younger, pressures for access to the vaccine against COVID-19 are less high than in
Western countries with an aging population. Social planners can also consider separately
or simultaneously other factors in the allocation of a limited number of vaccines. These

pe

factors include occupational exposure to disease and the epidemiological parameters such
as transmission rate, effective reproductive numbers, and immunity threshold.
In this model, even if an agent i is in none of the two allocations X and Y , they can
still support a challenge of X for Y , simply because agent i’s ideal might be closer to Y

ot

than to X. For instance, when µ = 1, the configuration of relationships given in Figure
2-(a) induces an empty set of stable vaccine allocations. If the allocation {1} is proposed,

tn

then the influential coalition {2, 6} prefers the allocation {6}; if {6} is proposed, then the
influential coalition {1, 5} prefers {5}; if {5} is proposed, then the influential coalition
{2, 6} prefers {6}, etcetera. Similarly, we can show that for µ = 2, there is no stable

rin

vaccine allocations.

µ = 3 is the lowest value of µ for which the core is not empty for the configuration
in Figure 3-(a). Specifically, we show that X = {5, 6, 7} is the only stable allocation
in Figure 3-(a). Indeed, the only influential coalition that would have challenged X is

ep

S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, but there is no allocation that is collectively better than X for members
of S. However, in the second configuration (Figure 3-(b)), several alternative allocations
to X are available to members of S such that there is no stable vaccine allocations. This

Pr

example shows that the social structure of the community affects the existence of a stable
allocation of vaccines.
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4.1

Characterization of Stable Allocations in Unselfish Societies

In what follows, we provide a characterization of the core for any vaccine allocation
e To do this, we need to introduce additional concepts and notations.
game V d ∈ V.
Let I − (µ) = {S ∈ I : |S| ≤ µ} denote the set of minimal influential coalitions, and
I + (µ) = I\I − (µ) = {S ∈ I : |S| > µ}, the complementary set of I − (µ) in the in-

fluence structure I. When there is no ambiguity, we use the notations I − and I + for

ev

I − (µ) and I + (ν), respectively. The set I + consists of majority influential coalitions.
Giving a majority influential coalition A ∈ I + , and an allocation B ∈ N (µ), we introduce

er
r

i
the set ΛA,B defined as follows: ΛA,B = A ∪ {j ∈ N : ∃i ∈ A/d (q i , q j ) ≤ αB
}, where


i
i k
−
+
αB = min d q , q
. Lastly, we consider I = I ∪ {ΛA,B : A ∈ I , B ∈ N (µ)},
k∈B


−
+
I = S ∈ I : |S| ≤ µ and I = S ∈ I : |S| > µ .

To illustrate the set ΛA,B , let N = {1, ..., 7} and the ideal points of Figure 3-(a) in Example 5. Consider the symmetric weighted influence structure I(4) = [4; 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].

pe

For µ = 1, we have I(4)− = ∅, because any influential coalition contains more than one
agent. It follows that I(4)+ = I(4). Furthermore, N (µ) = {{k} : k ∈ N }.
• Consider for instance the winning coalition A = {1, 2, 3, 4} ∈ I(4) and the coalii
= d (q i , q 6 ), and N \A = {5, 6, 7}. By definition,
tion B = {6}. We have αB

ot

ΛA,B = {1, 2, 3, 4} ∪ {j ∈ N : ∃i ∈ A/d (q i , q j ) = d (q i , q 6 )}. For j = 5, we have
d(q 1 , q 5 ) < d(q 1 , q 6 ), and 1 ∈ A; similarly, for j = 6, we have d(q 1 , q 6 ) = d(q 1 , q 6 ),

tn

and 1 ∈ A; and for j = 7, we have d(q 2 , q 7 ) < d(q 2 , q 6 ), and 2 ∈ A. Therefore,
ΛA,B = N .

• If A = {1, 4, 5, 6} ∈ I(4) and B = {6} then, for any j ∈ N \A = {2, 3, 7} and

rin

for any i ∈ A, we have d (q i , q 6 ) < d (q i , q j ), i.e., j ∈
/ ΛA,B . We deduce that
ΛA,B = A.

• Now, consider any influential coalition A ∈ I(4), and the coalition B = {k}, where

ep

k 6= 6. It is straightforward to show that there is i ∈ A such that d (q i , q 6 ) ≤

i
d q i , q k = αB
, i.e., 6 belongs to any ΛA,B . It follows that {6} is a stable vaccine
allocation when µ = 1. In fact, we show that {6} is the only stable vaccine

Pr

allocation.

Theorem 3 provides a complete characterisation of the set of stable vaccine allocations
26

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3955958

iew
ed

in a spatial model.


e C(V d ) = X ∈ N (µ) : ∀S ∈ I, {q i } ∩ X 6= ∅ .
Theorem 3. For all V d = (E d , µ) ∈ V,
i∈S

Proof. ⊆) Let X = {X 1 , .., X µ } ∈ N (µ), we need to show that: if X ∈ C V d , then

for any S ∈ I we have {q i }i∈S ∩ X 6= ∅. By contraposition, it is sufficient to show that,

if there is S ∈ I such that {q i }i∈Sn∩ X = ∅, then X ∈
/ C V d . For
o these purposes,
−
+
−
consider a coalition S ∈ I = I ∪ ΛA,B : A ∈ I , B ⊆ N, |B| = µ . If S ∈ I then,
a Y because by definition, S ∈ I

−

ev

let Y = {Y 1 , .., Y µ } ∈ N (µ) such that {q i }i∈S ⊆ Y . It is always possible to choose such

means that |S| ≤ µ. Since {q i }i∈S ∩ X = ∅ and

er
r

{q i }i∈S ⊆ Y , it is clear that any individual i ∈ S prefers q i ∈ Y to any X k ∈ X. It

/ C Vd .
follows that X is challenged nby Y because S ∈ I, therefore Xo∈
−
+
If S ∈
/ I then, S ∈ ΛA,B : A ∈ I , B ⊆ N, |B| = µ , that is there are A ∈
+

i
I , B ⊆ N such that |B| = µ and S = ΛA,B = {j ∈ N : ∃i ∈ A, d (q i , q j ) ≤ αB
},


i
= min d q i , q k . Let Y = {Y 1 , .., Y µ } ∈ N (µ) such that the
where for any i ∈ A, αB
k∈B

pe

components of Y are the points of {q i }i∈B . It should be noted that it is always possible
to choose such a Y because by definition
|B| = µ. For any i ∈ A, let us choose li ∈ B



i
i
= min d q i , q k = d q i , q l . The existence of li is certain because, B
such that αB
k∈B

i
is a nonempty and finite set. It should be noted that if i ∈ B then, li = i and αB
= 0.
k

ot

For any k ∈ {1, .., µ}, there is j k ∈ N such that X k = q j , where j k ∈
/ S because

tn

i
{q i }i∈S ∩ X = ∅. We know that jk ∈
/ S implies j k ∈
/ {j ∈ N : ∃i ∈ A, d (q i , q j ) ≤ αB
},
i li
i
i jk
> αB ≥ d q , q . It follows that any individual
meaning, for any i ∈ A, d q , q
i

i ∈ A prefers q l ∈ Y to any X k ∈ X, that is, X is challenged by Y via A ∈ I

therefore X ∈
/ C Vd .

+

⊆ I,

rin

⊇) Let X = {X 1 , .., X µ } ∈ N (µ) such that for any S ∈ I we have {q i }i∈S ∩ X 6= ∅,

we need to show that X ∈ C V d , or equivalently, we must show that X is not challenged.
Consider Y = {Y 1 , .., Y µ } ∈ N (µ) and a winning
n coalition T ∈+ I: Can Y dominate
o X
−
via T ? By assumption, for any S ∈ I = I ∪ ΛA,B : A ∈ I , B ⊆ N, |B| = µ , we

ep

have {q i }i∈S ∩ X 6= ∅. Thus, if T ∈ I

−

then {q i }i∈T ∩ X 6= ∅. Let j ∈ T such that

there is t ∈ {1, .., µ} , q j = X t , there is no k ∈ {1, .., µ} such that individual i prefers Y k

Pr

to X t because d (q i , X t ) = d (q i , q i ) = 0. In this case, Y can’t challenge X via T .

−
+
Assume that T ∈
/ I then, T ∈ I : let B = k : q k ∈ Y , by definition S =
ΛT,B ∈ I and by assumption, {q i }i∈S ∩ X 6= ∅.

Remember that S = ΛT,B =
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i
i
{j ∈ N : ∃i ∈ T, d (q i , q j ) ≤ αB
} , where for any i ∈ T , αB
= min d q i , q k . Conk∈B

sider j ∈ N such that: (1) there is t ∈ {1, .., µ} , q j = X t , and (2) there is i ∈ T ,


i
d (q i , q j ) ≤ αB
= min d q i , q k . There is no k such that individual i prefers Y k to X t
k∈B

i
because: for any k, we have d (q i , X t ) = d (q i , q j ) ≤ αB
≤ d q i , q k . And then, Y can’t
challenge X via T .

In Section 3, we determine the minimum number of vaccine doses that guarantees the

ev

existence of a stable allocation in a selfish community. Theorem 3 provides a complete

characterization of the core of a vaccine allocation game in a spatial model with unselfish
preferences. The core may be empty as described in Example 3 in Section 2.4. We want

er
r

to provide an investigation similar to the one in Section 3 on the effects of vaccine supply
on the non-emptiness of the core in an unselfish society. We need additional notation.
For a given spatial political economy E d = (N, I, {q i }), let HE d be the set of non-zero
integers k such that for any integer t ≥ k there is S ∈ N (t) such that for any influential

pe

coalition A ∈ I: if |A| ≤ t, then S ∩ A 6= ∅, otherwise, for any B ∈ N (t), S ∩ ΛA,B 6= ∅.
Definition 7. The spatial stability index of a spatial political economy E d , denoted


µ∗ E d , is defined as follows : µ∗ E d := min (HE d ).
The notion of a vaccine allocation game with a stable horizon remains the same as in

ot

Definition 4 in Section 3.1. We have the following result.
Corollary 1. Let E d = (N, I, {q i }) be a spatial political economy. For any integer µ and

tn

unselfish preference profile (-di ), the spatial vaccine allocation game Gd = hE d , µ, (-di )i

has a stable horizon if and only if µ ≥ µ∗ E d .

rin

Proof. The proof of this corollary follows directly from Theorem 3.
For several reasons, including vaccine attributes, misinformation on public attitudes
towards vaccination (Kreps et al., 2021; Brewer et al., 2017), online and offline mis-

ep

information surrounding the safety and effectiveness of vaccines (Loomba et al., 2021;
Fridman et al., 2021), and culture (Schmelz & Bowles, 2021), the social planner may
receive incomplete information about agents’ ideal points. Theorem 4 shows that the set

Pr

of stable vaccine allocations is robust to small perturbations of agents’ preferences. In
other words, if the difference between agents’ perceived ideal points from the planner’s
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viewpoint and agents’ true ideal points is small (or does not exceed a certain threshold),
then the allocation of vaccine will not jeopardize the planner’s popularity.

Theorem 4. Apart from a negligible set of configurations {q i }, given V1d = hN, µ, I, {q i }i ∈
e there exists a positive real number γ such that for all V d = hN, µ, I, {pi }i ∈ V,
e if for
V,
2

i

i

any agent i ∈ N , d(p , q ) ≤ γ, then

C(V1d )

=

C(V2d ).

Proof. For purpose of clarity, we provide a detailed proof of Theorem 4 for two-dimensional

ev

games. One can naturally extend the arguments of the proof to any dimension. We
proceed in three steps.

Step 1 : Let us specify the set of configurations of the ideal points to be discarded.

er
r

These are configurations such that three ideal points are aligned and configurations are
such that one ideal point is located equidistant from two other distinct ideal points. It must
be shown that these configurations are negligible in the sense of measurement. For this
purpose, let us assume that the ideal points are drawn at random on a domain D of non-

pe

zero finite measure. Randomly drawing three distinct positions such that one is located at
an equal distance from two others is equivalent to randomly drawing three distinct points
X, Y and Z such that Z belongs to the perpendicular bisector of the segment [X, Y ].
This probabilistic event can be translated into two events: (A1 ) randomly choose two

ot

distinct positions X, Y ; and (A2 ) randomly draw Z on the perpendicular bisector of the
segment [X, Y ]. It is clear that P (A1 ) > 0, the conditional probability rule results in:
P (A1 ∩ A2 ) = P (A1 ) × P (A2 /A1 ). Moreover A2 /A1 is the probability of drawing Z on

tn

the perpendicular bisector of the segment [X, Y ] knowing X and Y , which is zero. To
denote configurations which are such that no ideal point is on the perpendicular bisector
of the segment formed by two other ideal points, we use the expression λ-almost any

rin

configuration.


Step 2 : By assumption, for λ-almost any configuration, we have: d (q i , q j ) 6= d q i , q k


i.e., d (q i , q j ) < d q i , q k or d q i , q k < d (q i , q j ). Let us show that there is a strictly

ep

positive real number ρ such that: given three distinct individuals i, j and k, such that


pi ∈ B (q i , ρ), pj ∈ B (q j , ρ) and pk ∈ B q k , ρ , we have d (q i , q j ) < d q i , q k if and


only if d (pi , pj ) < d pi , pk . Assume that d (q i , q j ) < d q i , q k , then for any i ∈ N, let
i1 be the agents of N \ {i} whose ideal point is closer to that of i and i2 be the agents of

Pr

N \ {i, i1 } whose ideal point is closer to that of i. By assumption, an ideal point is not
located at the same distance from two others, therefore, 0 < d (q i , q i1 ) < d (q i , q i2 ). Let
29
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ρi =

and ρ = min {ρi : i ∈ N }.


Given three distinct individuals i, j and k, such that d (q i , q j ) < d q i , q k , if pi ∈

B (q i , ρ), pj ∈ B (q j , ρ) and pk ∈ B q k , ρ , then the most distant points pi and pj that

er
r

ev

can be obtained are as such: d (pi , pj ) = d (q i , q j ) + 2ρ. Likewise, the closest points


pi and pk that can be obtained are as such: d pi , pk = d q i , q k − 2ρ. It follows


that d pi , pk − d (pi , pj ) ≥ d q i , q k − d (q i , q j ) − 4ρ. By construction, we have ρ ≤


d(q i ,q k )−d(q i ,q j )
i j
i k
i k
thus,
−4ρ
≥
d
(q
,
q
)
−
d
q
,
q
.
We
finally
get
d
p
,
p
− d (pi , pj ) ≥
4


d q i , q k − d (q i , q j ) > 0, i.e., d (pi , pj ) ≤ d pi , pk .


In the same way, we can show that if d q i , q k < d (q i , q j ), then d pi , pk < d (pi , pj ).

Step 3 : Now let us show that for a given vaccine allocation game V2d = N, I, {pi }i , µ ,


if for any i ∈ N, d(pi , q i ) ≤ ρ, then C V1d = C V2d . It is sufficient
n 1 to show
o that
µ
for any S ∈ I, for all X = {X 1 , .., X µ }, Y = {Y 1 , .., Y µ }, X = X , .., X
and
n 1
o


µ
k
k
Y = Y , .., Y
such that for any k ∈ {1, ..., µ}, X ∈ B X k , ρ and Y ∈ B Y k , ρ ,
we have: X is challenged by Y via S for V1d if and only if X is challenged by Y via

pe

S for game V2d . By definition, X is challenged by Y if and only if for any i ∈ S,
min {d (q i , Z)} < min {d (q i , Z)}. From Step 2, for all three distinct individuals i, j and
Z∈Y
Z∈X


k, we have d (q i , q j ) < d q i , q k if and only if d (pi , pj ) < d pi , pk . It follows that, for any
i ∈ S, min {d (q i , Z)} < min {d (q i , Z)} if and only if min {d (pi , Z)} < min {d (pi , Z)},
Z∈Y

Z∈X

Z∈Y

Z∈X

ot

i.e., X is challenged by Y via S for V1d if and only if X is challenged by Y via S for game

4.2

tn

V2d . The combination of the three steps allows the proof to be concluded with γ = ρ.

An Application to Minority Inclusion

In the spatial model, it is essential to know the coordinates of the ideal points in the con-

rin

sidered space. However, in some circumstances, the social planner may not completely
infer agents’ ideal points. It is also necessary to account for the cost of the investigations
to obtain the information on the agents. For this reason, we must consider alternative

ep

approaches to capturing the distance between agents. Networks provide a way of addressing this concern. Networks model connections (direct or indirect) that may exist between
agents. We can use these relationships to evaluate how close an agent is to others. Fac-

Pr

tors such as gender, occupation, political ideology, beliefs, or ethnicity induce relationships
between agents. In the specific case discussed in this application, agents are the nodes of
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a weighted undirected network structure. Each vertex between two agents is associated

with a weight corresponding to the distance between the two agents connected by this

vertex. If there is no vertex between two agents, then they are considered to be infinitely
distant. In a network, a connected component is a maximum subset of nodes. Any two
nodes in a component are connected by a path, i.e., a series of vertices between nodes in
the considered subset.

To illustrate, consider an undirected weighted network with n nodes numbered from

er
r

ev

1 to n. The nodes are the agents involved in a spatial vaccine allocation problem V A =
 
(N, µ, I, A) such that I is the weighted influence structure defined by I ≡ I( n2 ) =
 n 

; 1, ..., 1 , and A is a network structure that describes connections between agents.
2
 
The quota, q = n2 , is the smallest integer which strictly exceeds the real number n2 ; that
is a simple majority influence structure. Note that the network A replaces the agents’
ideal points profile in a spatial vaccine allocation problem.

To describe the network A, we assume that the set of agents N is partitioned into two

pe

subsets denoted N1 and N2 . If N1 contains n1 agents and N2 contains n2 agents, then
n1 + n2 = n. Each of the two subsets N1 and N2 corresponds to a connected component.
Figure 4 displays a specific network A, involving 11 agents such that N1 = {1, ..., 8} and
N2 = {9, 10, 11}. For practical reasons, we assume that each vertex has a measure of 1,

ot

and the absence of a link is assimilated to an infinite distance. Thus, the preferences of
the agents are such that, agents prefer themselves first, then the members of their network
depending on the length of the connection path, and finally the other agents. Assuming

tn

that the total number n of agents is odd, it follows that one of the two groups is an
influential coalition (majority) and the other is not (minority). Without loss of generality,
assume that N1 is an influential coalition and as a consequence, N2 is not. For a spatial

rin

vaccine allocation problem V A = (N, µ, I, A), how does the number of vaccine doses µ
affect minority inclusion in core allocations of these doses?
It is straightforward that, if µ ≥ q, then any vaccine allocation is stable. Assume

ep

that µ < q. For the configuration considered in Figure 4, if there is only one vaccine
dose, then {1} is the only stable allocation. Indeed, if the single dose is given to agent 7

for instance or to an agent chosen in N2 , then, the members of the influential coalition
S = {1, ..., 6} will propose the allocation {1} to challenge the proposed allocation. With

Pr

the same reasoning, we show that if µ = 2, then, the stable allocations are in the form
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Figure 4: Illustration of an unselfish community on the network structure A
{1, k} where k ∈ {2, ..., 8}. Remark that these allocations are not minority-inclusive as
they do not reserve any vaccine dose for a minority individual. Similarly, if µ = 3, no
vaccine dose will go to a minority individual in any stable allocation. Stable allocations

pe

that allocate vaccine doses to minority individuals exist only for µ at least equal to 4.
In fact, it holds in this example that the analysis of the existence of a stable allocation in
 

V = (N, µ, I, A) is reduced to the vaccine allocation problem V A = N2 , µ, I( n2 ), A ,
 
where I( n2 ) is the weighted influence structure defined on N2 , with the same quota
 
 
q = n2 as the influence structure I( n2 ). In this case, there is a better chance of

ot

A

obtaining a stable allocation since everything happens as if the members of N1 were

tn

A
excluded but without changing the quota.
the stability
 index of V
  In other words,

cannot exceed that of V A , that is µ∗ V A ≤ µ∗ V A . For µ = µ∗ V A , there is at

rin

least one stable allocation but no member of the influential coalition N1 belongs
to a

∗
∗
A
A
stable allocation. For µ > µ V , in a stable allocation, up to µ − µ V
doses of
vaccine can be released for members of N1 . This shows that inclusive
are possible
 policies

only if the number of vaccine doses exceeds the threshold µ = µ∗ V A .

Finally, if the members of N1 are pairwise
then the set N1 can be compared
 connected,


ep

to a selfish community. In that case, µ∗ V A = n1 − q + 1.

The application that we illustrate in Section 4 discusses the non-emptiness of the core

and inclusion in a polarized and unselfish society as a function of the supply of vaccine

Pr

doses µ. Though the findings in this application offer a glimpse of the issue, a formal
analysis of the problem is an avenue for future research. Section 4.2 also opens a discussion
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on whether a political leader can implement a stable and inclusive vaccine allocation in a
society organized around distinct groups where individuals have in-group preferences. The
application shows that their ability to enforce such popular and inclusive allocations in a

majoritarian democratic institution may depend on the supply of vaccines and, hence, on
society’s technological capability to produce vaccine doses.

Concluding Remarks

ev

5

In this study, we developed a theory that addresses the problem of the existence of stable vaccine allocations in a political economy. Stable allocations are defined as feasible

er
r

allocations that a social planner can implement without losing their popularity. We distinguished between contexts where vaccination has positive externalities on the unvaccinated
and contexts where it does not. When vaccination does not have any positive externalities
in that it only benefits the vaccinated individual, agents have selfish preferences; and when

pe

it has positive externalities, agents have unselfish preferences.

We have seen that when the supply of vaccine doses is sufficiently low relative to the
number of individuals eligible to receive a dose, a stable allocation may not exist. In such
a situation, any policy implemented by the social planner will be unpopular. The absence

ot

of a stable vaccine allocation is caused by highly divergent preferences. This observation
motivated us to investigate “structural” conditions under which a stable allocation policy
always exists. The identification of structural conditions is useful because such conditions

tn

do not depend on preferences and can therefore inform policy design. Assuming that
individuals have selfish preferences, we characterized the minimum number of vaccine
doses that guarantees the existence of a stable policy regardless of the level of preference

rin

heterogeneity. This number only depends on the society’s influence structure.
We also studied some properties of stable vaccine allocations under selfish preferences.
In particular, we investigated the relationship between voting rights and priority in access

ep

to vaccine. We found that when individuals have unequal voting rights, stable allocations
favor those with greater voting power. In other words, if there exists a stable allocation
that gives an individual a vaccine dose, there must also exist a stable allocation that gives

Pr

any individual that possesses more voting power a vaccine dose. A direct implication is
that the likelihood of an individual having priority in access to vaccines increases with the
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amount of voting power the individual wields.

When agents have unselfish preferences and the society is such that proximity between

individuals varies, we also characterized the minimum number of vaccine doses that guar-

antees the existence of a stable vaccine allocation policy. This number depends both on

the society’s influence structure and the patterns of proximity between individuals. Unselfish preferences can be explained by the fact that a person’s vulnerability to infection

decreases if their close neighbors are less vulnerable or are vaccinated. In an application,

ev

we explore one implication of such preferences for minority inclusion in the design of stable

vaccine allocations. We found that while a stable vaccine allocation policy may exist, it
may not be minority-inclusive, especially if the number of vaccine doses is very small. Also,

er
r

in such situations, minority-inclusive policies may not be stable, creating a dilemma for
the social planner. These findings open discussions into the circumstances under which
a social planner can feasibly design a vaccine allocation policy that is both stable and
inclusive in a fragmented society.

pe

Finally, we would like to emphasize that while our analysis focuses on vaccine allocation, our results extend to the allocation of any scarce good in a political economy
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